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The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Respondent in this action brought by Petitioners seeking to collect real estate brokerage commissions allegedly due after the tenant of the property exercised its option to renew a lease that Petitioners had procured for a prior owner, holding that the lower courts’ judgments were correct. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) even if Petitioners qualified as third-party beneficiaries, that only gave them the right to sue whomever was liable; (2) because Respondent was not a party to the lease its assignors also were not parties; and (3) in the assignment of the lease the assignors had expressly rejected any obligations of the lease, and therefore, Respondent was not liable. View "Cushman & Wakefield of Maryland, Inc. v. DRV Greentec, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court affirming the judgment of the district court in favor of Landlord on Landlord’s suit against Tenant seeking to recover unpaid rent that it claimed Tenant owed from 2008, holding that actions for back rent under residential leases are subject to a three-year period of limitations regardless of whether the lease includes provisions that purport to convert it into a contract under seal. In 2007, Tenant entered into a residential lease for an apartment. In 2015, Landlord brought suit seeking to recover unpaid rent it claimed Tenant owed from 2008. Tenant claimed that Landlord had not filed suit within the three-year period of limitations in Md. Code Ann. Cts & Jud. Proc. (CJ) 5-101 that applies to action seeking back rent. The district court entered judgment for Landlord, concluding that the lease qualified as a “contract under seal” and that the twelve-year statute of limitations set forth in CJ 5-102 applied. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the three-year period of limitations set forth in CJ 5-101 governs actions for back rent under residential leases, regardless of whether the lease includes provisions that purport to convert it into a contract under seal. View "Smith v. Wakefield, LP" on Justia Law

Posted in: Landlord - Tenant

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The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals dismissing an appeal, on its own initiative, as premature and remanded the case to that court with instructions to treat the notice of appeal as timely filed, holding that the appeal should proceed on the merits in the Court of Special Appeals. Petitioner petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that he timely filed the notice of appeal and that the appeal should be reinstated. The Court of Appeals exercised its discretion to hold that, under the circumstances of this case and pursuant to Maryland Rule 8-602(g)(1)(D), Petitioner’s notice of appeal should be treated as if it were filed on the same day as but after the entry of the trial court’s final judgment. View "Carver v. RBS Citizens, N.A." on Justia Law

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In this medical malpractice case, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the circuit court’s judgment in favor of Plaintiff, holding that the trial court’s instructions did not mislead the jury as to the applicable law and were not an abuse of discretion. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendant, a neurosurgeon who had performed surgery on Plaintiff. After a jury trial, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Plaintiff, concluding that Defendant had been negligent. On appeal, Defendant challenged to sets of instructions given during trial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in including pattern jury instructions on general negligence and foreseeability in its initial charge to the jury and in coupling that instruction with the information that jury deliberations would continue for just one more hour. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court’s instructions did not mislead the jury as to the applicable law; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in advising the jury how long it would be required to continue its deliberations. View "Armacost v. Davis" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, which reversed the determination of the Commissioner of Labor and Industry that the Whiting-Turner Contracting Company violated Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Employee. 5-104(a) by failing to “furnish employment and a place of employment which were free from recognized hazards that were causing or likely to cause death or serious physical harm to employees,” holding that there was substantial evidence for the Commissioner to determine that Whiting-Turner violated section 5-104(a). Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the Commissioner correctly determined (1) Whiting-Turner’s failure to follow the shoring-tower manufacturer’s instructions to use looser braces in assembling a shoring tower supporting a concrete slab constituted a recognized hazard within the meaning of section 5-104(a); and (2) Whiting-Turner’s use of an undersized spacer beam in the upper support system of a shoring tower constituted a recognized hazard within the meaning of section 5-104(a). View "Commissioner of Labor & Industry v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Hartford County Housing Agency (HCHA) terminating Petitioner’s voucher, holding that the HCHA complied with procedural due process procedures under Maryland law and the United States Constitution and that the record contained substantial evidence. Petitioner sought judicial review of the HCHA’s decision to terminate Petitioner’s voucher. The circuit court determined that the record contained substantial evidence to justify the HCHA’s decision and upheld the termination. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the HCHA is not an “agency” for the purposes of the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act, and therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to a contested case hearing; and (2) Petitioner was afforded due process through an informal hearing and the HCHA’s written decision. View "McDonell v. Harford County Housing Agency" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the trial court’s denial of Petitioner’s motion for a new trial, holding that the trial court’s error of supplying the jury with an instruction that was an incorrect statement of the law was not harmless. Petitioner was convicted of first-degree child abuse. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for new trial on the grounds that the trial court gave a pattern jury instruction that erroneously omitted an element of the sole offense for which Petitioner was convicted. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that the erroneous jury instruction did not have an impact on the defense’s theory of the case. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the erroneous jury instruction was prejudicial error and warranted a new trial. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the Mayor and Common Council of Westminster (the Council), holding that substantial evidence in the record as a whole supported the Council’s denial of Petitioner’s application to amend the General Development Plan for Wakefield Valley (the Wakefield Valley GDP) to permit construction of fifty-three homes on “Parcel W” of a former golf course (the Application). After the Council voted to deny the Application, the Council adopted an ordinance denying the Application and incorporating an attached written decision. The circuit court affirmed the Council’s decision as set forth in the ordinance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Council’s decision denying the Application was a quasi-judicial act, not a legislative act, as was therefore subject to judicial review; (2) the Council did not err in considering the zonal classification of Parcel W in evaluating the Application; and (3) there was substantial evidence in the record to support the Council’s decision. View "WV DIA Westminster, LLC v. Mayor & Common Council of Westminster" on Justia Law

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At issue was whether, at a criminal trial on drug charges, the introduction of valid prescriptions for controlled substances are barred by the rule against hearsay or if, instead, they are non-hearsay and admissible as a “verbal act.” The circuit court in this case granted the State’s motion to suppress introduction of any supposed prescriptions for controlled substances on hearsay grounds. The Court of Special Appeals reversed each of Defendant's convictions except for his two convictions for possession of heroin and possession with intent to distribute heroin on the basis that “[v]alid prescriptions provide the basis of a statutory defense to the charges for possession of and possession with intent to distribute methadone, alprazolam, and oxycodone.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that evidence of a valid prescription can fall under the category of “verbal acts,” admissible not for the truth of the matter asserted but as the basis of a statutory defense under Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 5-601(a) and 602(2). View "State v. Young" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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In answering a question of law certified to it by the United States District Court of the District of Maryland, the Court of Appeals held that Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CJP) 12-601 to 12-613 is a statutory specialty and that actions on it are accorded a twelve-year limitations period. At issue was whether the licensing requirement of the Maryland Consumer Loan Law (MCLL), Md. Code Ann. Com. Law 12-302, was a statutory specialty as contemplated by CJP 5-102(a)(6) requiring filing within twelve years after the cause of action accrues. The Court of Appeals answered the question certified to it in the affirmative, holding that the MCLL’s licensing requirement is an “other specialty” within the meaning of CJP 5-102(a)(6) and that a claim brought on it is entitled to a twelve-year limitations period. View "Price v. Murdy" on Justia Law