Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner had health care insurance as a member of the United Healthcare Select HMO (the HMO) when he visited a healthcare provider (GCM) for an x-ray of his knee. After Petitioner paid a bill he received from GCM for the x-ray exam he filed a complaint alleging that the bills GCM sent Petitioner were an illegal attempt to "balance bill" an HMO member in violation of State law and that the bills constituted an unfair and deceptive practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Act (the Act). The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the state HMO law prohibiting balance billing by health care providers as part of the legal foundation for the establishment of HMOs does not include a right of action by an HMO member against a healthcare provider for violation of that prohibition; but (2) an HMO member may bring an action under the Act against a healthcare provider who improperly bills the member in violation of the state HMO law in a way that also violates the prohibition against unfair or deceptive trade practices in the Act.View "Scull v. Groover, Christie, & Merritt, P.C." on Justia Law

Appellant financed the purchase of a car over time pursuant to a loan contract. The car dealer assigned the contract to Appellee, a financial services company. Because Appellant stopped making payments before the loan was paid off, Appellee repossessed and sold the car. Appellant sued Appellee, alleging that the repossession and sale of the car did not comply with the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Law (CLEC). The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellant’s statutory claims were untimely under the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s one-year statute of limitations, and (2) Appellant’s complaint did not state a cause of action for breach of contract because the requirements of CLEC were not incorporated into the contract as to Appellee. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an action alleging a violation of CLEC must be brought no later than six months after the loan is satisfied pursuant to the CLEC’s statute of limitations, and therefore, Appellant’s claims under CLEC on limitations grounds were improperly dismissed; and (2) Appellant may assert a contract claim against Appellee because the loan contract adequately incorporated CLEC as part of the contractual obligations, and Appellee voluntarily accepted that provision in taking the assignment. View "Patton v. Wells Fargo Fin. Md., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant was assigned the serving rights to Plaintiff's mortgage on a piece of property. Plaintiff sued Defendant, claiming that Defendant attempted to collect more than was due on the loan. The parties settled. Plaintiff then filed this action against Defendant, alleging breach of the settlement agreement, defamation, and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. An order of default was later entered against Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, requesting that the default judgments be set aside because Plaintiff's claims were legally deficient. The trial court denied the motion. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a defaulting party who does not file a motion to vacate the order of default after a default judgment has been entered cannot file a Maryland Rule 2-534 motion to alter or amend a judgment to contest liability, and the defaulting party cannot appeal that judgment in order to contest liability. View "Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nefflen" on Justia Law

These two consolidated appeals concerned two appellants who separately sued the Housing Authority for Baltimore County (HABC) for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA) for injuries arising out of Appellants' alleged exposure to lead paint in properties that HABC owned and operated. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of HABC, finding that Appellants in both cases did not substantially comply with the notice requirement of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court properly concluded that Appellants did not substantially comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Appellants did not show good cause for their failure to comply with the LGTCA notice requirement; and (3) the LGTCA notice requirement, as applied to a minor plaintiff in a lead paint action against HABC, does not violate Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. View "Ellis v. Housing Auth of Baltimore County" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against multiple defendants alleging negligence and violations of Maryland's Consumer Protection Act (CPA) for injuries resulting from his exposure to lead-based paint when he lived at two properties in Baltimore City while he was an infant. At the close of discovery, Defendants filed several dispositive and evidentiary motions, which the trial court granted. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was the exclusion of a lead test report, the exclusion of testimony by Petitioner's medical expert, and the grant of summary judgment as to Petitioner's CPA cause of action. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the court of special appeals erred in holding that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in excluding the lead test report and the testimony by Petitioner's medical expert; and (2) the court of special appeals did not err in affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment as to Petitioner's cause of action under the CPA. Remanded. View "Butler v. S&S P'ship" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of the alleged exposure of Plaintiff to lead paint at the homes in which she spent her childhood. Petitioner, by her mother, sued the owners of two of the homes, for negligence and unfair trade practices under the Consumer Protection Act. Only the claims against the second owner proceeded to trial. The circuit court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant after excluding proposed expert opinion testimony of a pediatrician to establish Defendant's building as the source of Plaintiff's lead exposure and elevated blood lead levels. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the proposed expert testimony; but (2) summary judgment in this case was not appropriate, as disputes of material fact existed to foreclose a grant of summary judgment. View "Ross v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City" on Justia Law

Gladys Garner and Randolph Scott defaulted on their respective automobile loan agreements. Both contracts were governed by the provisions of the Creditor Grantor Closed End Credit Act of the Commercial Law Article (CLEC). The contracts were later assigned to Ally Financial, Inc., Nuvell National Auto Finance, and Nuvell Financial Services (collectively, GMAC). GMAC repossessed both vehicles and informed the debtors that the vehicles would be sold at a "public auction." Both cars were later sold. The debtors filed separate complaints against GMAC alleging, in part, that GMAC violated the CLEC because the sales of their cars were in reality "private sales," requiring GMAC to provide a detailed post-sale disclosure to them under the CLEC, which GMAC had not done. The federal district court combined the cases and granted summary judgment for GMAC, concluding the sales were "public auctions" because they were both widely advertised and open to the public for competitive bidding. The federal appellate court then certified an issue for clarification to the Maryland Court of Appeals. The Court answered that the auctions were in reality "private sales" because attendance was limited to those who paid a refundable $1,000 cash deposit. View "Gardner v. Ally Fin., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against Respondent for unfair and deceptive trade practices and for common law fraud. Petitioner's complaint was based on an automobile warranty he purchased from Respondent that expired more than two years earlier than he had been led to believe. Petitioner purported to bring his action on behalf of others similarly situated. Before Petitioner filed a motion to certify the class, however, Respondent paid to extend Petitioner's warranty. The circuit court (1) denied Petitioner's motion for class certification, finding that because he had been made whole, Petitioner was no longer a member of any class; (2) granted in part Respondent's motion for summary judgment, finding Petitioner's claim moot; and (3) granted Petitioner attorney's fees for the period before and after Respondent tendered Petitioner individual relief. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Respondent's tender of individual compensatory relief to Petitioner did not require the court to deny class certification; (2) an award of punitive damages is not foreclosed by the tender of individual compensatory damages; and (3) an award of attorney's fees to Petitioner under a fee-shifting provision of the Consumer Protection Act is not limited to fees incurred before the tender. View "Frazier v. Castle Ford, Ltd." on Justia Law

On behalf of himself and a proposed class of others similarly situated, Plaintiff filed an action challenging the legality of Ticketmaster's collection of a service charge on a concert ticket he purchased for a concert in the city. The complaint was based on provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) if a ticket agency is authorized in writing by a licensed exhibitor to sell tickets as an agent of the exhibitor, the ticket agency is not required to be licensed; (2) the Code prohibits the collection of a service charge, in addition to the established price printed on the ticket, in connection with the original sale of the ticket by the exhibitor, and is not limited to ticket resales; (3) the Code does not permit anyone other than a ticket agency licensed under the Code to collect anything more for a ticket than the established price printed on the ticket plus taxes; and (4) a common law action for money had and received will lie to recover money paid in excess of that allowed by statute if the agreement pursuant to which it has been paid has not been fully consummated. View "Bourgeois v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the Maryland Credit Services Businesses Act (CSBA) applies to a tax preparer who receives payment from a lending bank for facilitating a consumer's obtention of a refund anticipation loan (RAL) where the tax preparer receives no direct payment from the consumer for this service. In this case, the circuit court dismissed Consumer's CSBA claim for failure to state a claim, concluding that the General Assembly enacted the CSBA to regulate credit repair agencies and not RAL facilitators. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of the CSBA most logically is understood as reflecting the legislative intent that the "payment of money or other valuable consideration" in return for credit services flow directly from the consumer to the credit service business; and (2) therefore, under the CSBA, Tax Preparer in this case was not a "credit services business" nor a "consumer"; and (3) accordingly, the CSBA did not apply in this case. View "Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc." on Justia Law