Justia Maryland Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief enjoining the State Board of Elections from certifying the 2018 general election ballot with April Ademiluyi's name listed as a candidate for circuit court judge, holding that the Libertarian Party's nomination of Ademiluyi did not comport with the requirements of Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law (EL) 5-701 and that the circuit court's grant of preliminary injunction was sufficiently supported by the appropriate factors. Ademiluyi was a registered Democrat. Upon learning of Ademiluyi's party affiliation, Appellees challenged her qualifications for nomination as a circuit court judge. The circuit court ordered that Ademiluyi's be removed from the ballot. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of preliminary injunctive relief, holding that Ademiluyi's candidacy was impermissible under the relevant provisions that regulate judicial elections in Maryland because (1) Ademiluyi's candidacy was at odds with the Libertarian Party's Constitution, which requires that its candidates for office be registered Libertarians; and (2) a judicial candidate's route to access the ballot is dependent upon her party affiliation, and candidates registered with a principal party may only achieve this end through participation in primary elections. View "Ademiluyi v. Egbuono" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the juvenile court finding that sixteen-year-old S.K. was involved in distributing child pornography, holding that a minor may be adjudicated delinquent under Maryland's child pornography and obscenity statutes as the "person" who is a distributor of child pornography and a displayer of obscene matter when she is also the minor participant in the sex act. S.K. sent a video to her two best friends that showed herself performing fellatio in a male. When the video was later distributed to other students S.K. was charged under Md. Code Crim. Law (CR) 11-207(a)(4) and 11-203(b)(1)(ii). After an adjuratory hearing, the juvenile court found S.K. involved as to distributing child pornography and displaying an obscene item to a minor. The court of special appeals reversed in part, holding (1) a minor legally engaged in consensual sexual activity is not exempted from CR 11-207(a)(4); and (2) the cellphone video was not an "item" covered within CR 11-203(b)(1)(ii). The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the plain language of CR 11-207(a)(4) subsumes situations where a minor produces and distributes pornographic material of himself or herself; and (2) S.K.'s conduct fell within that contemplated by CR 11-203. View "In re S.K." on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals overturning Defendant's conviction based on a lack of independent evidence that would corroborate accomplice testimony, holding that Maryland's common law accomplice corroboration rule is hereby abrogated and that the jury, after proper instruction about the possible unreliability of accomplice testimony, is entitled to weigh the sufficiency of the evidence without the need for independent corroboration. Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit armed carjacking. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the accomplices' testimony was not independently corroborated by other evidence, which left the remaining evidence legally insufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction. The Court of Appeals held (1) the common law accomplice corroboration rule, which requires that accomplice testimony be independently verified to sustain a conviction, is hereby abrogated and replaced with a modified common law rule; and (2) the new rule should not apply to Defendant. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case involving the claim of Petitioner, a veteran paramedic/firefighter regarding degenerative meniscal tears in his right knee the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court denying Baltimore County's motion for summary judgment and concluding that Petitioner's degenerative meniscal tears could be classified as an occupational disease, holding that there was ample evidence that Petitioner's employment actually caused the degenerative tears. The trial court determined that Petitioner met the statutory requirements set forth in Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. (LE) 9-502(d)(1) that his alleged occupational disease was "due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist...." The County appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was sufficient evidence for the jury reasonably to conclude that Petitioner's degenerative knee tears were "due to the nature of an employment in which hazards of the occupational disease exist." View "Baltimore County v. Quinlan" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the trial court granting Defendants' motion to dismiss this action brought by a former tenant of a public market in Baltimore City, holding that the tenant was not a "displaced person" as that term is defined in Md. Code Ann. Real Prop. (RP) 12-201(e)(1)(i), and therefore, the tenant was not wrongfully denied moving and relocation expenses and there was no unconstitutional taking. After a rental agent for the public market advised the tenant that its business did not fit in the redevelopment plans for the market and that it should pursue other options, the tenant vacated the market. The tenant sued seeking compensation for moving and relocation expenses as a displaced person and for an unconstitutional taking. The trial court dismissed the action, concluding that the tenant did not qualify as a "displaced person" because the exemption in RP 12-201(e)(2)(iii) applied. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tenant was both not a displaced person under RP 12-201(e)(1)(i) and exempt from qualifying as a displaced person under RP 12-201(e)(2)(iii). View "Wireless One, Inc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals vacating the circuit court's dismissal of Defendant's motion for modification of sentence without ruling on the merits, holding that where a defendant has been granted postconviction relief to file a belated motion for modification of sentence the circuit court abuses its discretion by not exercising its "fundamental jurisdiction" to revise a sentence. The postconviction court ruled that Defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed timely to file a motion for modification. Accordingly, the postconviction court granted Defendant's permission to file a belated motion for modification. In compliance with the postconviction court's order, Defendant filed a motion for modification within ninety days of the postconviction court's order. The Supreme Court ruled that the trial court had revisory power over Defendant's sentence, and therefore, the court erred when it prematurely concluded that it lacked revisory power over Defendant's sentence and thereby failed to exercise its discretion to rule on the motion for modification of sentence. View "State v. Schlick" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of two counts of criminal attempt for his refusal to testify in a murder trial, holding that Defendant failed to proffer sufficient evidence of duress to generate the defense of duress. Defendant was called to testify in a murder trial but refused to answer any questions on the basis of the privilege against self-incrimination. The court subsequently issued an order immunizing Defendant and directing him to testify, but Defendant continued to refuse to answer questions. Defendant was subsequently charged with contempt. During the trial, Defendant attempted to raise the common law defense of duress. The trial court rejected the defense as a matter of law and found Defendant guilty of contempt. Defendant appealed, arguing that duress can be a defense to a contempt charge for a refusal to testify. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that even assuming the defense of duress was available to Defendant, Defendant's proffered evidence failed to generate the defense of duress because the alleged threat was not "present, imminent, and impending." View "Howell v. State" on Justia Law

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In this challenge to the action of the Prince George's County Council sitting as the District Council approving a special exception and variance sought by Wal-Mart Real Estate Business Trust regarding an existing store located in the Woodyard Crossing Shopping Center in Clinton, Maryland, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Council has extensive authority to regulate and establish zoning laws and procedure, which includes special exception and variance application. The ZHE issued a decision denied an application for a special exception and variance sought by Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart filed exceptions to the Zoning Hearing Examiner's (ZHE) decision and requested that the District Council hear the case. Petitioners responded in opposition to Wal-Mart's exceptions. The District Council proceeded to approve Wal-Mart's application for a special exception and variance. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed the District Council's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the District Council is authorized to delegate the preparation of its opinion and order to its staff attorney; (2) the District Council rightfully exercises original jurisdiction when hearing zoning cases from the ZHE; and (3) Petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence that the District Council violated the Maryland Open Meetings Act. View "Grant v. County Council of Prince George's County" on Justia Law

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In this defamation action, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the trial court's judgment granting judgment at the end of Plaintiff's case in favor of Defendants, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that a plaintiff in a defamation action, who is also the defendant in a related criminal case, is not entitled to a stay of the civil lawsuit she initiated pending resolution of the criminal case. Plaintiff filed a defamation complaint against Defendants alleging defamation, alleging that Defendants made false statement to the police that Plaintiff stole money from them and committed identity fraud. Plaintiff was later indicted for the same events underlying the defamation action. Plaintiff moved to stay the civil action, asserting that Plaintiff's testimony in the civil action would implicate her constitutional right against self-incrimination in her criminal case. The circuit court denied the motion and later granted judgment for Defendants on all counts. The court of special appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying Plaintiff's motion to stay the proceedings. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court's decision to deny the stay was not an abuse of discretion. View "Moser v. Heffington" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the trial court's grant of Petitioners' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the basis that Petitioners were grossly negligent and their gross negligence caused the ultimate demise of Kerry Butler, Jr., holding that Petitioners were not grossly negligent in their treatment of Butler and were therefore afforded immunity under the Fire and Rescue Company Act, Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-604(a). The Estate of Kerry Butler and several of Butler's family members (collectively, Respondents) filed this wrongful death and survival action against Petitioners, two Baltimore City Fire Department medics. A jury found that Petitioners were grossly negligent. The trial court granted Petitioners' motion for JNOV, concluding that the evidence of gross negligence was insufficient. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that Respondents were grossly negligent and not entitled to immunity under the Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the jury could not have found that Petitioners were grossly negligent by a preponderance of the evidence; and (2) section 5-604(a) unambiguously confers immunity upon municipal fire departments in simple negligence claims. View "Stracke v. Estate of Butler" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury