Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of a domestic altercation between Husband and Wife. Wife filed a petition for protection from domestic violence against Husband. The district court issued a final protective order against Husband. Prior to the expiration of the protective order, Wife filed a motion to extend the order. Two days after the expiration of the protective order, the district court scheduled a hearing on the motion. After the hearing, the district court extended the protective order. The circuit court affirmed, reasoning that, as long as a motion to extend a protective order is filed during the term of the order, that protective order may be extended even if a hearing on the motion is held after the protective order has expired. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 4-507(a) does not permit a court to extend an expired protective order even when the motion to extend the order was timely filed during the term of the order. View "La Valle v. La Valle" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner, who had a prior non-violent felony conviction, was convicted of wearing and carrying a handgun and two counts of possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a prior conviction. The court of special appeals vacated as duplicitous Petitioner's conviction and sentence for one count of possession of a regulated firearm by a person previously convicted. The Supreme Court (1) vacated Petitioner's sentence for possession of a regulated firearm, holding that Petitioner was wrongful subjected to an enhanced penalty under Md. Code Ann. art. 27, 449(e), which requires that a predicate prior conviction be for a crime that is both violent and felonious; and (2) held that the rule of lenity required that Petitioner be sentenced in accordance with Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 5-622(c) rather than section 449(e) because both penalty provisions proscribe the same conduct, but section 5-622(c) mandates a lesser penalty, and the legislature did not clearly express how the two statutes were intended to interface. Remanded for resentencing. View "Alston v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed this action for negligence and assault against Defendant. Upon reaching a verdict, the jury foreman answered the court clerk's questions about the negligence count by using the verdict sheet submitted to and completed by the jury. The trial court found Defendant to be negligent based on these answers. However, it was not until after the jury was dismissed that the judge received the jury's completed copy of the verdict sheet, upon which the jury indicated that it intended to award damages. The trial judge enrolled the verdict sheet as the jury's verdict, awarding damages accordingly. The court of appeals vacated the award because that portion of the jury's verdict had not been announced in open court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) after a jury verdict is orally announced, the verdict is subject to a judge's revisory powers; (2) revision is permissible only when the intent of the jury is manifest beyond doubt; and (3) the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in revising the verdict to include the award of damages as shown on the verdict sheet, as the revision effectuated the intent of the jury. View "Turner v. Hastings" on Justia Law

In 2009, Respondents, residents of the Jacksonville community, were awarded damages by a jury for an Exxon contractor's puncture of an underground gasoline feed line at an Exxon Mobil-owned gasoline service station. Several thousand gallons of gasoline leaked into the local underground aquifer and contaminated the source of the wells supplying water to Respondents' households. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the damages award and ordered all costs to be paid pro rata by Respondents. Respondents subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. Exxon responded with an amended request for bond premium costs seeking reimbursement. The Supreme Court denied the motion for reconsideration and Exxon's request but changed the mandate in Ford to order that the parties shall bear their own costs, concluding that requiring Respondents to bear $1 million in premium bond costs was unreasonable under the circumstances. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Ford" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, in two separate lawsuits, sued a medical doctor and medical center for medical negligence, lack of informed consent, and fraud. Prior to the trial date, Defendants successfully moved to bifurcate the trials. The administrative judge of the circuit court vacated the trial judge's orders bifurcating the trials and reassigned the cases to another judge for trial. Defendants filed a petition for writ of mandamus or prohibition to reverse the administrative judge's orders. The Court of Appeals vacated the administrative judge's orders and reinstated the orders of the trial judge, holding that, under the circumstances, the administrative judge did not have the authority to review and vacate the trial judge's decision to bifurcate the trials and to unilaterally reassign the cases. View "St. Joseph Med. Ctr. v. Circuit Court (Turnbull)" on Justia Law

In 1997, the Bellevale Respondents sold an agricultural preservation easement on their dairy farm, Bellevale Farms, to a state agency (MALPF). Twelve years later, Bellevale asked MALPF to permit it to construct a creamery operation on the farm under the terms of the easement. MALPF approved the proposal, despite challenges from owners of real property adjacent to Bellevale Farms and a community association (collectively Petitioners). Petitioners filed this action against Bellevale Farms, MALPF, and others (collectively Respondents), seeking a declaration that the creamery violated the easement and an order prohibiting the construction of the creamery. The circuit court dismissed the action, concluding that Petitioners lacked standing to enforce the easement. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the easement constituted a charitable trust, and therefore, they possessed standing as "interested persons" under Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 14-302(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the instrument creating the easement and the statutory scheme of the MALPF program through which the easement was purchased did not indicate that Respondents intended to or created a charitable trust with a charitable purpose; and (2) therefore, Petitioners did not have standing under 14-302(a) to maintain a cause of action to enforce the easement. View "Long Green Valley Ass'n v. Bellevale Farms, Inc." on Justia Law