Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was a passenger in a motor vehicle accident in which her husband, the driver, was killed and Petitioner suffered serious injuries. At the time of the accident, Petitioner and her husband had a motor vehicle liability insurance policy with State Farm Auto and an umbrella policy with State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (collectively, State Farm). State Farm denied Petitioner's claim under the umbrella policy pursuant to a household exclusion, which excluded coverage in certain instances for injury the insured's family members. Petitioner contended that the household exclusion in the umbrella policy was void in light of Md. Code Ann. Ins. 19-504.1, which requires an insurer to offer liability coverage for family members in the same amount of liability coverage for nonfamily members under a policy of "private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance." The circuit court ruled in favor of State Farm. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the umbrella policy did not fit within the definition of "private passenger motor vehicle liability insurance" as contained in section 19-504.1, such that State Farm was not required to offer Petitioner and her husband liability coverage for family members in the same amount as the liability coverage for nonfamily members. View "Stickley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. " on Justia Law

When a property or casualty insurer becomes insolvent, the Maryland Property & Casualty Insurance Guaranty Corporation (PCIGC) assumes responsibility for any outstanding claims or litigation. In this case, an insurance company settled a claim with an insured party but became insolvent before the agreement could be approved by a court. Respondents filed a complaint against PCIGC seeking declaratory relief, asking the circuit court to find they settled the claim and that PCIGC was obligated to pay the statutory maximum on both an underlying insurance policy and an umbrella policy. PCIGC sought to challenge the settlement reached by the parties and argued that it should not have to pay its statutory maximum on the policies when the claims stemmed from a single incident. The court of special appeals held (1) PCIGC may challenge a settlement only on limited grounds, such as fraud or collusion, and the corporation bears the burden of proving its reason for challenging a claim, and (2) PCIGC was liable for the statutory maximum on both policies. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) PCIGC had no sufficient grounds for properly challenging the settlement; and (2) requiring PCIGC to pay covered claims under separate policies was within its statutory mandate. View "Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Corp. v. Beebe-Lee" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree assault and aggravated cruelty to animals. The court of special appeals affirmed the convictions. Petitioner petition for writ of certiorari, arguing (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his felony animal cruelty conviction, and (2) his attorney's failure, after the close of all evidence, to renew the motion for judgment of acquittal constituted ineffective assistance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support Petitioner's conviction of felony animal cruelty; and (2) it was unnecessary to address Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance since it rested solely on his assertion that the evidence presented against him was insufficient to sustain his felony animal cruelty conviction. View "Haile v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners challenged the validity of two Prince George's County ordinances regulating the packaging, sale or other distribution of cigars on several alternative grounds. One of Petitioners' arguments was that the General Assembly had legislated in the area so extensively that an intent to occupy the entire field must be implied. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions for summary judgment, rejecting each of Petitioners' contentions. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for the entry of a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, holding that state law occupies the field of regulating the packaging and sale of tobacco products, including cigars, and thus impliedly preempts the two ordinances enacted by the county council of Prince George's County. View "Altadis U.S.A., Inc. v. Prince George's County" on Justia Law

Landowners believed they had the right to use a ten-foot wide strip of land that was used as a driveway to property owned by a Trust. The community homeowners association (Association) and six residents of the subdivision (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed suit against the Trust and the Trust's settlor (collectively, Petitioners) seeking a declaratory judgment that the Association held fee simple title to the strip and that the Landowners' property enjoyed an easement over the strip. Petitioners responded with a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment that the Trust held fee simple title to the strip and no easement existed in favor of any plaintiff. The circuit court concluded that the Trust held all title and interest in the strip and that the Trust's interest was subject to an easement appurtenant to the Landowners' property for the purposes of ingress and egress. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that the Landowners had an easement over a five-foot wide portion of the strip. View "Lindsay v. Annapolis Roads Prop. Owners Ass'n" on Justia Law

The City of Baltimore initiated a condemnation action to acquire an old theater once used as a vaudeville venue. The theater's owner (Owner) contested the action, arguing that the City had no right to condemn the property. Six weeks before trial, Owner filed an emergency motion demanding a postponement and an order requiring the City to pay to move all the junk out of the theater prior to trial so the jury would not view the property in its existing condition. The trial court denied the motion and the jury viewed the theater as is. The court of special appeals ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Owner's motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Owner was not entitled to a payment in advance of trial, and Owner suffered no prejudice from the denial beyond what it brought upon itself. View "A&E North, LLC v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Respondent, a minor who was having trouble breathing, was transferred by helicopter from a hospital to a university medical center. Present on the flight was a paramedic employed by Petitioner TransCare Maryland, Inc., who had been invited to ride along by the UMMS nurse for training purposes. During the flight, Respondent's heart rate and oxygen level began to drop because the endotracheal tube had allegedly become dislodged and was blocking Respondent's airway. Respondent, by his mother, filed a complaint against TransCare, a commercial ambulance company, alleging medical malpractice on the basis that its employee had failed to provide the requisite standard of care and that TransCare was liable for Respondent's resulting brain injury under the principle of respondeat superior. The circuit court granted summary judgment for TransCare, concluding that TransCare was immune under the Good Samaritan Act and the Fire and Rescue Act. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that neither statute applied to a private, for-profit ambulance company. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither statute relieved TransCare of liability for the allegedly negligent actions of its employee while its employee was in training. View "Transcare Maryland, Inc. v. Murray" on Justia Law

The Maryland Economic Development Corporation (MEDCO) is a public corporation established by the legislature to aid in promoting the economic development of the State. This litigation arose from MEDCO's involvement in the development of a technology development center. MEDCO sought a loan with Bank to finance the center. MEDCO executed a leasehold deed of trust with Bank requiring MEDCO to pay all recording costs and fees in connection with filing the loan documents. MEDCO subsequently presented the deed of trust for recording in Montgomery County, claiming an exemption from the recordation tax based on Md. Code Ann. Econ. Dev. 10-129(a), which granted MEDCO a tax exemption "from any requirement to pay taxes or assessments on its properties or activities." The county transfer office denied the exemption and required MEDCO to pay recordation tax. The county department of finance denied MEDCO's recordation tax refund claim. The tax court denied MEDCO's petition for appeal. The circuit court reversed, and the court of special appeals reversed the circuit court. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, based on the plain language of section 10-129(a), the legislature intended to exempt MEDCO from paying the recordation tax at issue in this case. View "Md. Econ. Dev. Corp. v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Tiffany Alston, a former member of the Maryland House of Delegates, was removed as a delegate after she was convicted and sentenced for misconduct in office. Before Alston fulfilled the conditions of her sentence, the assistant attorney general declared her removed from her House seat by operation of law. Gregory Hall was nominated to fill Alston's seat. While Hall's nomination was before the Governor, the Governor requested that the Democratic Central Committee of Prince George's County (Central Committee) withdraw the nomination. Hall filed a complaint seeking to prevent the withdrawal of his nomination. Alston filed, as an intervener and third-party plaintiff in the same case, a separate complaint seeking a declaration that she had been merely suspended, rather than removed, from her House seat because her conviction and sentence had been converted into probation before judgment. The circuit court ruled (1) Alston had been removed by operation of law on the date she was sentenced for her misconduct in office conviction; and (2) the Central Committee had the power to rescind Hall's nomination at any time before the Governor made the appointment. The Supreme Court affirmed, finding no error in the circuit court's judgment. View "Hall v. Prince George's County Democratic Cent. Comm." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that the trial court's replacement of a juror with an alternate juror without the knowledge or acquiescence of defense counsel was a violation of Maryland Rule 4-326(d) and, therefore, reversible error. The court of special appeals affirmed, holding that no prejudice occurred by the removal of the juror. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding (1) the trial court's unilateral action in discharging the juror and replacing her with an alternate without first notifying defense counsel was error; and (2) the State did not carry its burden of establishing that Defendant was not prejudiced by the rule violation. View "Grade v. State" on Justia Law