Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002, county voters adopted an amendment to the county charter relating to the resolution by binding arbitration of collective bargaining impasses with the county's law enforcement employees and uniformed firefighters. In 2003, the county council adopted an ordinance implementing that charter provision. In 2011, the county council amended the 2003 ordinance to provide that binding arbitration did not require the council to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award in arbitration. An uncodified section of the 2011 council bill also provided that, if any part of the 2011 ordinance were held invalid, the entire county code section enacted by the 2003 ordinance, as amended through the 2011 ordinance, would be deemed repealed by operation of law, with the result that impasses would be addressed by a code section that did not authorize binding arbitration. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the 2011 ordinance violated the 2002 charter amendment. The circuit court held the 2002 charter amendment violated the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2002 charter amendment bound the county council; and (2) portions of the 2011 ordinance, as well as its uncodified section 3, violated the charter and were invalid. Remanded. View "Atkinson v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law

Respondent was convicted by a jury of second-degree depraved heart murder. Respondent appealed his conviction to the court of special appeals, where he argued, inter alia, that the trial court's failure to disclose to him a communication between a juror and the judge's secretary violated Maryland Rule 4-326(d), requiring reversal of his conviction. The intermediate appellate court agreed and reversed the conviction, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error when it failed to disclose, in accordance with Rule 4-326(d), the communication, and in remanding the case for a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court's failure to disclose the subject communication to counsel was error, and because it prejudiced Respondent, this error required reversal of Respondent's conviction. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

Petitioners were beneficiaries of a testamentary trust who sued the trustee, Respondent PNC Bank. Petitioners alleged that PNC improperly demanded that each beneficiary execute a broad release agreement prior to distribution and misapplied the provisions of the Maryland Code, Tax-General Article in calculating the amount of inheritance tax owed on the trust's assets and the amount of commission to which PNC was entitled as trustee. The circuit court granted summary judgment in PNC's favor, finding no legal impropriety in PNC's distribution plan or its calculation of the tax and commission. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PNC's actions were in accord with Maryland law. View "Hastings v. PNC Bank, NA" on Justia Law

Petitioner was tried before a jury in the circuit court and convicted of four counts of attempted armed robbery, four counts of conspiracy to commit those offenses, and related crimes. The court of special appeals concluded that the four conspiracy convictions should merge, leaving but one such conviction, and rejected Petitioner's remaining contentions, holding (1) the instructions satisfied the constitutional requirement that the jury be advised of the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged crimes, and (2) fundamental fairness did not require merger of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. Petitioner sought review of the latter two holdings of the court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing its jury instructions; and (2) because the convictions targeted two different crimes, fundamental fairness did not require merger of Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery with his attempted armed robbery convictions. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent entered a gas station owned and operated by Petitioner, where she mis-stepped on even ground and twisted her knee. Respondent subsequently filed a negligence suit against Petitioner. The trial court denied Petitioner's request to include on the special verdict sheet a question specifically addressing the assumption of risk defense and thereafter entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's failure to adequately present assumption of the risk constituted error because Petitioner had a right to present the defense to the jury, and that error prejudiced Petitioner's case. Remanded for a new trial. View "S&S Oil, Inc. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Maryland Dream Act seeks to exempt certain students from paying out-of-state tuition rates at higher education institutions in Maryland. Following the enactment of the Act, MDPetitions.com petitioned to refer the Act to Maryland's 2012 general election ballot. The State Board of Elections certified the petition for referendum. In response to the Board's certification, Appellants, representing a group of individuals supporting the Act, challenged its referability and sought to remove the Act from consideration on the November 2012 ballot. The trial court entered summary judgment against Appellants, finding that the Act was a proper subject for referendum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act was not a law "making any appropriation for maintaining the state government" within the meaning of Md. Const. art. XVI, 2, and therefore was not exempt from referendum. View "Doe v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a test technician's certification that a driver refused to complete an alcohol concentration test after initially submitting to it - when coupled with the evidence that the driver had been explained the testing procedure and was in "good health" - was prima facie evidence of refusal under Md. Code Ann. Transp. 16-205.1. The ALJ and Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings found that it was and suspended the driver's commercial driver's license. The circuit court reversed, holding that the Motor Vehicle Administration failed to show evidence that the driver refused the test. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) there was prima facie evidence of refusal, and (2) the ALJ's finding that the driver refused to complete the test was supported by substantial evidence. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. McMillan" on Justia Law

For some years, the Board of Education of Baltimore County belonged to a governmental group purchasing consortium, which competitively bid a roofing services contract on behalf of its members. The Board relied on that contact to fulfill its needs for roofing repair services. Appellant Building Materials Corporation of America, a nationwide manufacturer of roofing materials, questioned the Board's authority for that practice under the pertinent statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when viewed in the context of the entire education law and regulations promulgated under that law, the competitive bidding statute did not bar the Board from using its membership in an intergovernmental purchasing consortium for the procurement of roofing repair services. View "Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law