Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Barclay was injured in a collision with a car driven by Christopher Richardson, a longshoreman, who had fallen asleep at the wheel while traveling home after a twenty-two hour shift at his job site located at the Port of Baltimore. Barclay and his wife filed a complaint against several parties, including Richardson's employer, Ports America Baltimore, Inc., alleging that Ports was liable for Barclay's injuries under the theory of respondeat superior and primary negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ports, finding (1) respondeat superior was inapplicable because Richardson was not acting within the scope of his employment was commuting home from work; and (2) Ports could not be held primarily liable for the injuries because it owed no duty to the public to ensure that an employee was fit to drive his personal vehicle home. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, Ports may not be held vicariously liable for Richardson's motor vehicle tort; and (2) Ports had no duty to Barclay based solely on the fact that Richardon's fatigue was a foreseeable consequence of the employment. View "Barclay v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

This matter stemmed from an order of the circuit court granting Petitioner postconviction relief by vacating his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and leaving in place Petitioner's related convictions for felony murder and first degree rape. The court of special appeals reversed that order and reinstated Petitioner's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's writ for certiorari and the State's conditional cross-petition, holding (1) the court of appeals properly exercised jurisdiction when it decided the State's appeal; (2) Petitioner was not entitled to postconviction relief; and (3) the term-of-years Petitioner received for first degree premeditated murder, but not the sentence for first degree rape, was illegal and must be corrected on remand. Remanded. View "Greco v. State" on Justia Law

In the recent decision in Bates v. Cohn, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a borrower challenging a foreclosure action must ordinarily assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of the foreclosure sale in advance of the sale. After the sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregulatories in the conduct of the sale, although the Court left open the possibility that a borrower could assert a post-sale exception that the deed of trust was itself the product of fraud. This case arose out of the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the residence of Darnella and Charles Thomas by Jeffrey Nadel and others. In apparent hope of fitting their post-sale exceptions within the question left open in Bates, the Thomases alleged certain defects in the chain of title of the note evidencing their debt and characterized them as a "fraud on the judicial system." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged defects did not establish that the Thomases' deed of trust was the product of fraud. View "Thomas v. Nadel" on Justia Law

After a sheriff's deputy pulled Ronald Lipella over for swerving outside the proper travel lane on a county highway, the deputy administered to Lipella three standard field sobriety tests, all of which Lipella failed. An ALJ subsequently suspended Lipella's driver's license was subsequently for driving while intoxicated. The circuit court held that the ALJ's suspension of Lipella's license was unsupported by substantial evidence, concluding that the deputy failed to indicate adequately on the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) Form DR-15A the reasonable grounds for the underlying traffic stop that led to the license suspension. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding (1) the Implied Consent Statute does not require the officer to supply the grounds for the underlying traffic stop, but rather, the officer is required to provide on the DR-15A form the reasonable grounds for the suspect's intoxication; and (2) thus, the ALJ concluded properly that the MVA mounted successfully a prima facie case, which was unrebutted, supporting the suspension of Lipella's license. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lipella" on Justia Law

The Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County (BOCC) appointed a nine-member charter board in 2011. The Maryland Constitution provides that the BOCC shall hold a special election for consideration of additional nominated charter board members under certain circumstances. Petitioners, individuals who sought membership on the charter board, circulated a petition in support of nominating candidates for consideration at a special election. The Frederick County Board of Elections (the Board) determined that Petitioners did not satisfy the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary for the BOCC to call a special election. The circuit court judge affirmed the determination made by the Board that the petition contained an insufficient number of valid signatures to require the BOCC to hold a special election. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and held (1) the Board applied the correct standard for reviewing and validating petition signatures under Md. Code An. Elec. Law 6-203(a), as interpreted by the Court in recent opinions; (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not applicable to the circumstances of this case; and (3) the mandatory petition signature requirements in 6-203(a) and COMAR 33.06.03.06B(1) were not unconstitutional. View "Burruss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jerome Pinkney was convicted of second degree assault and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by failing to inform him of his right to discharge counsel and proceed to trial pro se. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial judge was not required under the plain language and meaning of Rule 4-215(e) to inform Petitioner of the right to conduct his trial pro se in the absence of a statement by Petitioner reasonably indicating a desire to represent himself at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge was not required to inform Petitioner of his right to pro se representation in a situation where the trial court denied Petitioner's unmeritorious request to discharge trial counsel and petitioner made no statement that reasonably could be understood as indicating a desire to invoke the right to self-representation. View "Pinkney v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the Maryland Credit Services Businesses Act (CSBA) applies to a tax preparer who receives payment from a lending bank for facilitating a consumer's obtention of a refund anticipation loan (RAL) where the tax preparer receives no direct payment from the consumer for this service. In this case, the circuit court dismissed Consumer's CSBA claim for failure to state a claim, concluding that the General Assembly enacted the CSBA to regulate credit repair agencies and not RAL facilitators. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of the CSBA most logically is understood as reflecting the legislative intent that the "payment of money or other valuable consideration" in return for credit services flow directly from the consumer to the credit service business; and (2) therefore, under the CSBA, Tax Preparer in this case was not a "credit services business" nor a "consumer"; and (3) accordingly, the CSBA did not apply in this case. View "Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Angelia Anderson brought a medical malpractice action in the U.S. District Court against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA contains a two-year statute of limitations regarding the timeliness of bringing claims against the government. However, if there is substantive law in the state where the claim arose governing the timeliness of a similar claim, the state provision controls over the FTCA's statute of limitations. A state statute of repose is considered substantive law and prevails over the procedural FTCA statute of limitations. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jursidiction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Maryland Supreme Court. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109(a)(1), which provides that the time period allowed for bringing a medical malpractice action is five years from the time the injury was committed, was a statute of limitation or a statute of repose. The Court held that the plain language of section 5-109(a)(1), confirmed by its legislative history, demonstrates that the statute is a statute of limitations, rather than repose. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law