Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in May, 2012
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In 1976, Petitioner Merle Unger was indicted for felony murder, armed robbery, and using a handgun in the commission of the felony. During the trial, the trial judge told the jury that all of the judge's instructions as to the law were advisory. In 1996, Unger filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the judge's instructions at his 1976 trial violated his right to due process of law because they empowered jurors to ignore the law. The post-conviction trial court granted a new trial. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that because Unger did not object to the advisory instructions given in his case, he waived his right to receive postconviction relief. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the trial judge's instructions at Unger's trial, telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters were "merely advisory" were clearly in error, at least as applied to matters implicating federal constitutional rights. View "Unger v. State" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was whether a man who claimed to be the father of a child conceived while the mother was married to another man, but born after the mother and her husband divorced, had an unconditional right to genetic testing to determine whether he was the biological father. The circuit court denied Respondent's request for paternity testing after applying the best interest of the child standard employed in two cases from the Court of Appeals, Kamp v. Department of Human Services and Monroe v. Monroe. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-1002(c), Respondent was entitled to a blood test. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the circuit court did not err by considering the best interests of the subject child when rejecting the requested blood testing. View "Mulligan v. Corbett" on Justia Law

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Appellants, a power plant limited partnership and a power plant, leased from the City of Baltimore two adjoining pieces of real estate. After the properties were valued by the City's supervisor of assessments, Appellants challenged the valuations. The property tax assessment appeals board and tax court affirmed. In both cases, Appellant introduced appraisals and testimony that valued the properties at a lower figure based in part on the existence of ground leases owned by the City. The leases, however, were not introduced into evidence during the proceedings. The circuit court affirmed the valuation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tax court did not err in its decision to disregard the effect of the ground leases because Appellants did not establish that the leases in issue restricted its use of the properties. View "Cordish Power Plant Ltd. P'ship v. Supervisor of Assessment" on Justia Law

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Respondents in this case were an instructional aid and teacher employed by the public school system. Petitioner, the Department of Human Resources, received reports accusing Respondents of committing child abuse and later issued a finding of "child physical abuse - unsubstantiated." As a result, neither Respondent was named as the alleged abuser, but Respondents' names were entered into the central registry of child abuse investigations. Respondents requested an appeal regarding the decision of 'unsubstantiated' child physical abuse, but the Department denied the requests. Respondents subsequently filed mandamus actions, which the circuit court dismissed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Department failed to interpret Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1(c) properly, and that individuals who are investigated by a local department, with a resultant finding of "unsubstantiated," have a right to appeal regardless of any additional findings of actual responsibility. View "Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs." on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was the scope of authority of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division to issue administrative subpoenas in aid of its investigation into potential unfair and deceptive trade practices. The Division in this case sought documents it claimed were relevant to its investigation of Washington Home Remodelers (WHR). WHR demurred, asserting that the Division overreached by seeking discovery into matters in which the regulatory authority resided exclusively with either the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) or the Maryland Home Improvement Commission under their respective enabling statutes. The circuit court ordered the subpoena's enforcement. WHR appealed, insisting that the Division subpoena was not authorized by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Division's subpoena was authorized by the Consumer Protection Act, and therefore, the Court did not need to delve into conflicting investigatory prerogatives of separate administrative agencies. View "Wash. Home Remodelers, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., Consumer Prot. Div." on Justia Law

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Appellant Nancy Forster was terminated from the position of state public defender by the board of trustees of the state office of public defender. Forster subsequently filed a wrongful discharge action against the office of the public defender without first appealing administratively her termination. The circuit court dismissed Forster's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Forster appealed, arguing that the circuit court erroneously granted the State's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the merits of Forster's claim, holding that Forster failed to exhaust the available and primary administrative remedy provided to at-will, executive service State employees under Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 11-305, even though she was not given written notice by the board of trustees of the availability of that avenue of appeal, as section 11-305 does not require the appointing authority to provide notice of the available administrative appeal. View "Forster v. Office of Public Defender " on Justia Law

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After his convictions for attempted second-degree murder, attempted armed carjacking, and first-degree assault, Petitioner Chaz Bazzle appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by (1) failing to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and (2) allowing a witness to testify as to the certainty of his eyewitness identification. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence did not generate an instruction on voluntary intoxication because it was insufficient to allow a jury to rationally conclude that Petitioner was so intoxicated that he was unable to form the intent necessary to constitute his crimes; and (2) Petitioner failed to preserve his objection to the witness's testimony because the trial court, by stating that it would overrule the objection unless grounds were provided, triggered the requirement that Petitioner provide grounds or lose the opportunity to raise the objection on appeal. View "Bazzle v. State" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Daniel McNeal was convicted by a jury of possessing a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying crime but, in the same trial, acquitted of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. McNeal appealed, arguing that the Court of Appeals' opinion in Price v. State, which held that clearly and legally inconsistent jury verdicts in criminal cases were prohibited in Maryland, prohibited these factually inconsistent jury verdicts. The court of special appeals upheld McNeal's guilty verdict because the inconsistency between an acquittal for wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun and a conviction for possession of a handgun after prior conviction of a disqualifying crime was based on the jury's conclusions of fact, not of law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that its opinion in Price, which applies to verdicts that are legally inconsistent, does not apply to jury verdicts in criminal cases that are merely inconsistent factually, illogical, or "curious." View "McNeal v. State" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Michael McCloud applied for a handgun permit but was denied because in 2006 he had been convicted in the District of Columbia of attempting to carry a pistol without a license. In denying Petitioner's application, the state police relied on the Maryland attorney general's opinion advising that an out-of-state conviction can disqualify an applicant from obtaining a handgun permit. The permit denial was reversed by the state police's handgun permit review board, which held that the opinion did not apply to Petitioner's situation. The denial was reinstated by the circuit court. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court of special appeals did not err in adopting the views expressed in the attorney general's opinion to determine what constitutes a disqualifying crime; (2) accordingly, Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-101(g)(3) and 5-133(b)(1), which define a disqualifying crime, include out-of-state convictions; and (3) when determining whether such a conviction is a disqualifying crime, an agency must look to the maximum penalty for the equivalent offense in Maryland. View "McCloud v. Handgun Permit Review Bd." on Justia Law

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Appellees, the Libertarian Party and the Green Party, enjoyed ballot access privileges from 2007 to 2010, when they were unable to show their respective memberships consisted of at least one percent of registered Maryland voters or that their nominees for Governor received at least one percent of the total vote. Appellees then submitted 10,000 petition signatures to Appellant, the State Board of Elections, to regain their ballot access privileges. Appellant determined that many of the submitted petition signatures were invalid and, thus, Appellees did not satisfy the statutory requirements. Appellees sought a declaratory judgment that Appellant incorrectly applied the law regarding validation of petition signatures and that the applicable law was whether there was "sufficient cumulative information" from which Appellant could identify a signatory on a petition as a registered voter. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Appellees. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court, holding (1) the court erred in relying on a supposed "sufficient cumulative information" standard, as the requirements for petition signatures under Md. Code Ann. Elec. Law 6-203(a) are mandatory; and (2) pursuant to section 6-203(b), Appellant appropriately refused to validate and count duplicate signatures of individuals who previously signed the same petition. Remanded. View "Bd. of Elections v. Libertarian Party" on Justia Law