Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with possessing marijuana, importing into Maryland between 5 and 45 kilograms of marijuana, and related offenses. Near the beginning of the trial of his criminal case, after the prosecution's first witness had completed his direct testimony and before cross-examination by the defense, the circuit court permitted petitioner to discharge his attorney and represent himself. At issue was whether, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, petitioner's decision to waive counsel and to represent himself satisfied the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel. The court held that petitioner did not intelligently and knowingly waive counsel where the circuit court failed to inform him of the full range of penalties he faced as a subsequent offender and where the record did not show that petitioner had previously been told of the maximum penalties he faced as a subsequent offender.

Petitioner was found guilty of armed robbery and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony and sentenced to concurrent sentences of 25 years' imprisonment without the possibility of parole for armed robbery, and 5 years without the possibility of parole for the handgun violation. Petitioner sought review of the sentence by a three-judge panel pursuant to Maryland Code 8-102, 8-105 of the Criminal Procedure Article and the panel unanimously increased the sentence originally imposed to 45 years of executed time. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of conviction and sentenced petitioner to a total of 40 years of executed time. At issue was what was the "sentence previously imposed" when the judge's sentence was increased by a three-judge sentence review. The court held that, in that instance, the sentence imposed by the three-judge panel was the "sentence previously imposed" for purposes of Maryland Code 12-702(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals and petitioner's 40-year sentence.

Petitioner sued the owners of her childhood home alleging injuries from lead paint on the premises. At issue was the trial court's instruction regarding the joint responsibilities of landlords and tenants in keeping the property in good condition. The court held that the inclusion of the instruction was error because neither plaintiff's contributory negligence nor negligence of her family members were at issue in the case. The court also held that the error was prejudicial because it introduced into the jury deliberations the idea that plaintiff, or her family, could have also been to blame for the injuries and such an argument was not only irrelevant to the case but prohibited by law and policy. The court further held that the inclusion of the argument could have permitted the jury to speculate or precluded a finding of liability where it was otherwise appropriate.

Plaintiff, born in September 1983, filed a five-count complaint against defendant, her grandfather, in September 2008 alleging that he raped her on two separate occasions, the first of which occurred when she was either six or seven-years-old and the second incident when she was eight-years-old. At issue was whether section 5-117 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article could be properly applied retroactively to permit a claim that arose before the effective date of section 5-117 and which was barred by the prior statute of limitations. The court held that, assuming arguendo application of section 5-117 to plaintiff's claims represented a retrospective application of the statute, section 5-117 was a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it could be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year statute of limitations period as of the extended period's effective date on October 1st, 2003.

Petitioners attempted to vacate their escape convictions where they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment with a deferred, or "springing," start date and the sentencing judge informed them that if they stayed out of further legal trouble during that time, they could return to court before the start date and have their sentences vacated; where petitioners did not return to court and later failed to report on the respective start dates; and where petitioners were charged and pled guilty to second degree escape. At issue was whether a conviction and/or sentence for second degree escape was legally valid if it was predicated on the failure to obey a court order to report to a place of confinement where that court order was legally invalid. The court held that petitioner's failure to report for imprisonment was sufficient to support their escape convictions. The court also held that the subsequent ruling in Montgomery v. State allowed petitioners to challenge, in the appropriate venue, the validity of their "springing" sentences but did not, however, allow them to engage in self-help. The court further held that Maryland law had clearly foreclosed, as a defense to escape, a challenge to the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence.

As a result of an agreement reached during a post-conviction proceeding in the circuit court, the post-conviction court granted defendant a "re-sentencing" hearing before the judge who had imposed the sentence from which defendant was seeking post-conviction relief. At the request of the post-conviction court, defendant's counsel submitted a proposed order that the post-conviction court modified. At the re-sentencing hearing, the sentencing judge rejected defendant's request to impose the agreed upon sentence. Defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The court held that if a plea agreement reached during a post-conviction proceeding resulted in relief in the form of defendant's right to a belated motion for modification of sentence hearing before the judge who imposed the sentences that defendant was serving, the sentencing judge was not "bound" by that agreement. The court also held that when a post-conviction court granted defendant only the right to file a belated motion for modification of sentence, unless the judge who imposed the sentence was unavailable to decide the motion, the motion for modification must be presented to the judge who imposed the sentence. The court further held that if a sentencing judge breached a plea agreement by imposing a sentence that exceeded the sentence for which the defendant bargained and upon which defendant relied in pleading guilty, that sentence was "illegal," and could be corrected "at any time" pursuant to Md. Rule 4-345(a). Accordingly the court held that the sentence at defendant's re-sentencing hearing was not "illegal" and affirmed defendant's sentence.

Petitioner filed for a writ of certiorari where she was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses, including use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. At issue was whether the suppression court correctly concluded that petitioner was not in custody for purposes of Miranda when she made her first two statements to police and, regardless, to the the extent any error occurred, was it harmless in light of petitioner's later statements made after she was advised of and waived her rights under Miranda? Also at issue was whether the court should refuse to disturb the decision to decline review for plain error of the trial court's answers to two notes from the jury. The court held that petitioner was not entitled to suppression of the statement that she made to a police officer at the scene of the shooting. The court also held that the state should have been prohibited from introducing into evidence during its case-in-chief the statements petitioner subsequently gave to two other police officers where the statements were the product of a custodial interrogation that did not comply with Miranda. Accordingly, the second issue was moot.

Petitioner filed a writ of certiorari where he was convicted of second degree murder of an intended victim, second degree murder of an unintended victim, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime against the intended victim, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime against the unintended victim. At issue was whether the doctrine of transferred intent applied where both the intended victim and the unintended victim were killed. Also at issue was whether the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on a lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter as to the unintended victim where the court instructed the jury on second degree depraved heart murder. The court held that the doctrine of transferred intent was fully applicable where both the intended victim and unintended victim were killed and that the court's conclusion was entirely consistent with the holding in Poe v. State. Accordingly, the court also held that petitioner was not entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter as to the unintended victim.

Respondent, the rental property owner, filed a "Complaint for Repossession of Rented Property under Real Property section 8-401" against petitioner, the tenant, for failure to pay rent that was due. At issue was whether the owner of a multiple dwelling, who failed to obtain a license for the premises, as mandated by Section 11-10-102 of the Anne Arundel County Code, could nevertheless initiate summary ejectment proceedings for a tenant's failure to pay rent under Section 8-401 of the Real Property Article, Maryland Code. The court held that a rental property owner, such as the one here, who did not possess a current license to operate the premises was not entitled to utilize the summary ejectment procedures outlined in section 8-401 upon a tenant's failure to pay rent if the dwelling was located in a jurisdiction that required owners to obtain licenses. The court also held that the district court judge did not err in determining that petitioner did not demonstrate actual loss or injury due to respondent's failure to obtain a license for the premises and thus, was not entitled to damages.