Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed convictions related to a shooting death where he contended that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting several printed pages from petitioner's girlfriend's MySpace profile. The state did not question the girlfriend about the pages allegedly printed from her MySpace account but, instead, attempted to authenticate the pages as belonging to her through testimony of the lead investigator in the case. At issue was whether the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the MySpace evidence and whether electronically stored information printed from a social networking website could be properly authenticated. The court held that the trial judge abused his discretion in admitting the MySpace evidence where the picture of the girlfriend, coupled with her birth date and location, were not sufficient "distinctive characteristics" on a MySpace profile to authenticate its printout given the prospect that someone other than she could have created the site and posted the comment at issue. The court also held that possible avenues to properly authenticate a profile or posting printed from a social networking site might include asking the purported creator if she indeed created the profile and if she added the posting in question, searching the computer of the person who allegedly created the profile and examine the computer's internet history and hard drive, and obtaining information directly from the social networking site.

Claimant filed a claim against Government Insurance Company ("GEICO") for uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage after sustaining serious injuries as a result of a car accident. At issue was whether the coverage provisions of the GEICO policy entitled claimant to underinsured motorist benefits under the policy. The court held that claimant was not entitled to uninsured/underinsured coverage where Exclusion number 4 in the GEICO insurance policy was authorized by section 19-509(f)(1) of the Insurance Article, Maryland Code, 1997, 2006 Repl.Vol., and was applicable to the facts of this case.

Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners alleging that petitioners had breached their agreement to pay the "Advisory Fee" that respondent earned while acting as petitioners' broker in the sale of petitioners' real property. At issue was whether the seller of real property was entitled to refuse to pay an agreed upon fee to the broker who represented seller on the ground that the broker was a "dual agent." The court held that it was questionable whether there was any legally sufficient evidence of dual agency; and if there was any evidence, the jury was entitled to decide as a matter of fact that a dual agency did not exist. The court also held that there simply was no evidence of any other material fact that respondent had a duty to disclose but did not. Therefore, the court affirmed the jury award of damages to respondent.

The State of Maryland challenged the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals' decision to vacate respondent's guilty pleas where the voir dire did not show that the plea was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered into. At issue was whether the line of cases beginning with State v. Priet, involving Maryland Rule 4-242(c) and knowing and voluntary guilty pleas, was affected by the Supreme Court's decision in Bradshaw v. Stumpf. The court held that a trial court, in ensuring that a guilty plea was knowing, voluntary, and entered intelligently, relying on nothing more than a presumption that "in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of... what he is being asked to admit" ran contrary to Rule 4-242's requirement that there be an adequate examination "on the record in open court." Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment to vacate respondent's guilty plea where he provided no evidence tending to show that his plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.

Respondent Emanuel Tejada was convicted by a jury on two counts of attempted murder, armed robbery, and related offenses. Respondent and a co-defendant were scheduled to stand trial in Montgomery County. The trial was expected to last seven days. The jury selection process began with 60 prospective jurors. Midway through the exercise of peremptory challenges, the court noted that it would ârun out of jurorsâ before the process was complete. Jury selection could not continue because the jury commissioner could not procure additional jurors to keep to the trial schedule. Defense counsel suggested the parties start over with the selection process the next day when more jurors would be available to them. While the court and counsel discussed what to do about jury selection, co-defendantâs counsel (not Respondentâs counsel) raised an objection on the selection process. Eventually a jury was empanelled, and it convicted Respondent of the charges against him. Respondent appealed the judgments of conviction, contending that the bifurcated jury selection process denied him the right to an informed and comparative rejection of prospective jurors. The State opted not to challenge the trial courtâs judgment, but argued that Respondent failed to preserve his objection for appellate review. The Court of Special Appeals held that Respondent did preserve his objection to the jury selection process, and that the trial court erred in bifurcating the jury selection process. It vacated the convictions and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the appellate court did not err in finding the issue preserved for review, and its decision granting Respondent a new trial.

Petitioner Dwayne Peaks was convicted of multiple offenses following a jury trial in circuit court. Petitioner argued that the trial judge did not make an adequate determination of Petitionerâs competency to stand trial under state law. Defense counsel first raised the issue of Petitionerâs competency following his arraignment. The court then ordered an evaluation. The court found that Petitioner was competent to stand trial, but elected to reconsider the matter. A second evaluation was never completed because the case was transferred to another trial judge. Neither party raised the competency issue with the new judge. After advising Petitioner of his rights and plea negotiations, voir dire began. During this process, Petitioner requested to discharge his attorney because he believed the attorney was not adequately representing him. Petitioner sought to continue pro se. The trial judge allowed Petitioner to discharge his attorney. Petitioner became unruly during the remainder of voir dire, and was escorted from the courtroom several times. Voir dire was concluded without Petitioner or defense counsel. The court proceeded with trial, and eventually convicted Petitioner in absentia. Petitioner appealed his conviction through counsel from the Office of the Public Defender, alleging the trial court erred by not performing the second competency evaluation. The Supreme Court held that in light of the circumstances, even though Petitionerâs trial had already commenced, the trial judge did not violate state law by not conducting the second evaluation. The Court affirmed the lower courtâs decision.

Beka Industries, Inc. ("BEKA") sued the Board of Education of Worcester County ("County Board") alleging claims that arose from a written contract dispute between BEKA and the County Board when BEKA was dissatisfied with the methods and amounts of the County Board's payment for its work. The court considered several issues on appeal and held that a new trial was warranted where the County Board was precluded from presenting evidence on its recoupment claim and BEKA may have been awarded impermissible "delay damages" under the contract. The court also reversed the intermediate appellate court's holding that the County Board's governmental immunity was not waived unless and until BEKA proved that there was a funding mechanism to satisfy a judgment for money damages rendered against the County Board. Accordingly, court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the intermediate appellate court with direction to remand to the circuit court for a new trial.

Petitioner, a police officer, filed a complaint against respondent under the theory of respondeat superior and alleged negligent hiring/supervision and negligence in supervising 911 dispatch protocols when he suffered severe injuries from a car accident that occurred while he was pursuing a suspect from an "armed robbery." At issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that a police officer injured during a high-speed pursuit was barred by the common-law firefighter's rule from recovering in a tort action alleging negligence by a police dispatcher in giving the police officer faulty information that led to the commencement of the high-speed chase. Also at issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in declining to address whether a "special duty" exception to the firefighter's rule should be recognized in Maryland. The court held that the firefighter's rule barred petitioner's claim where he failed to show the court a reason, based either in law or policy, to limit application of the firefighter's rule and where adopting such a limitation on the rule ran counter to its undergirding public policy, which recognized that the very nature of the firefighter's or police officer's occupation limits the public safety officer's ability to recover in tort for work-related injuries. The court also held that petitioner's general opposition to the application of the firefighter's rule was not sufficient to allow the circuit court the opportunity to decide the issue and therefore, the court also declined to decide the issue.

Petitioner filed a breach of contract claim against its former employee claiming that the employee violated the terms of her employment agreement by breaching the duty of loyalty and by breaching a non-solicitation clause which was included in the contract. The employee filed a counterclaim alleging that petitioner withheld her bonus in violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Labor and Employment section 3-501. At issue was whether an employee who breached her duty of loyalty could seek certain of the provisions of the contract which she breached. Also at issue was whether a party could recover attorneys' fees pursuant to a contract provision that provided reimbursement of fees incurred when a third party retained and paid counsel and the party did not pay attorneys' fees, nor had any obligations to pay attorneys' fees. The court held that the employee's breach of duty of loyalty did not result in forfeiture of her rights under the fee shifting provision of the non-solicitation clause where the clause presented divisible rights and obligations from the remainder of the contract. The court also held that the employee was entitled to attorneys' fees under the fee shifting provision where she prevailed under the terms of the contract and the breach did not result in the forfeiture of her rights.

Respondent James Goldsberry, Jr. was tried before a jury in Prince Georgeâs County Circuit Court and convicted of second degree felony murder, conspiracy, attempted robbery and weapons charges. He appealed the judgments of conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, where he raised a number of claims. The appellate court found merit in some claims, and reversed some of the convictions. The court remanded the case for a new trial on the attempted robbery and weapons charges, but affirmed the conviction of second degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit felony murder. Both parties sought Supreme Court review of the case. The issues presented to the Court for consideration were: (1) whether the trial court violated Respondentâs Sixth Amendment rights to representation by his counsel of choice when it dismissed one of Respondentâs three privately retained attorneys; (2) whether the trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction on an unanimous verdict; and (3) whether the appellate court erred by holding Respondent was convicted of a ânon-existentâ crime of second degree felony murder predicated on attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did violate Respondentâs Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choosing, and that the appellate court erred in its holding regarding the felony murder violation. The Courtâs decision entitled Respondent to a new trial, and accordingly it did not address the propriety of the trial courtâs jury instruction.